---
Vulnerabilities
---
Vendors
---
Products
Vulnerability Media Exposure
These listed vulnerabilities have been referenced across multiple public sources, indicating high media attention and potential significance.
CVE-2026-124194 EUVD-2026-122310
MEDIUM

Product ui does not warn user of unsafe actions in Microsoft Office Outlook allows an unauthorized attacker to perform spoofing over a network.

microsoft:365_apps
microsoft:office_2021
microsoft:office_2024
microsoft:office
CVE-2026-109619 EUVD-2026-107265
HIGH

PHP has various global state that temporarily points into request memory. In some scenarios, global state may not be correctly reset, or may be repopulated after being reset. The global state may then refer to request memory even after it has been freed. Subsequent requests may read or branch on this stale state before it is fully initialized. Multiple strategies can trigger this condition and produce remote code execution (RCE).

Siemens:AMIS TS
Siemens:AX4
Siemens:blueplanet 360 NX3 M6 WM OD IISX
Siemens:blueplanet 360 NX3 M6 WM OD IISX - S
Siemens:Building X
Siemens:CADRA
Siemens:Call stations
Siemens:Capital
Siemens:Chargesight
Siemens:Climatix Cloud IC
Siemens:Climatix Devices
Siemens:Connect Insights
Siemens:Connect X200
Siemens:Connect X300
Siemens:Connect X500
Siemens:cRSP
Siemens:Depotfinity
Siemens:Designcenter
Siemens:Designcenter X
Siemens:Designcenter X Essentials
Siemens:Desigo CC
Siemens:Desigo DXR2
Siemens:Desigo DXR3
Siemens:Desigo Optic
Siemens:Desigo PXC3
Siemens:Desigo PXC4
Siemens:Desigo PXC5
Siemens:Desigo PXC7
Siemens:DFMExpress
Siemens:Energy Engage V2.0SP9
Siemens:Energy Engage V3.1SP1
Siemens:Energy Management System
Siemens:Enlighted RTLS
Siemens:Enlighted Space
Siemens:Heliox Flex Pro
Siemens:Heliox H60
Siemens:Heliox Rapid
Siemens:HyperLynx
Siemens:Insights Hub
Siemens:Local Monitoring bt-monitoring-vm
Siemens:Navigator E\&S
Siemens:Novigo VANSYS
Siemens:Novigo VANSYS core
Siemens:Opcenter Connect Electronics
Siemens:Opcenter Connect MOM
Siemens:Opcenter Execution Core
Siemens:Opcenter Execution Discrete
Siemens:Opcenter Execution Foundation
Siemens:Opcenter Execution Pharma
Siemens:Opcenter Execution Process
Siemens:Opcenter Intelligence
Siemens:Opcenter Intra Plant Logistics
Siemens:Opcenter Quality
Siemens:Opcenter RDnL
Siemens:Opcenter X
Siemens:PACE-Design
Siemens:PADS Pro Essentials
Siemens:PADS Pro Student Edition
Siemens:PADS Professional
Siemens:PADS Professional - XCR
Siemens:PADS Standard - XCR
Siemens:PADS Standard \& Standard Plus
Siemens:Pathway to Learning Engineering
Siemens:Polarion
Siemens:QuadView
Siemens:RUGGEDCOM APE1808
Siemens:Sicharge D
Siemens:Sicharge D Configuration Backend
Siemens:SICHARGE FLEX
Siemens:SICHARGE UC
Siemens:Sifinity Control
Siemens:Sifinity Go
Siemens:Sifinity Setup
Siemens:Simcenter Flomaster
Siemens:Simcenter Flux
Siemens:Simcenter Simlab
Siemens:Sinteso FS20 EN
Siemens:SiPass integrated
Siemens:SIPORT
Siemens:Siveillance Control
Siemens:Siveillance Control Pro
Siemens:Siveillance Intrusion
Siemens:Siveillance Video
Siemens:Solid Edge
Siemens:Spectrum Power 3
Siemens:Spectrum Power 4
Siemens:Spectrum Power 7
Siemens:Spectrum Power TG
Siemens:Supply Chain Suite
Siemens:Teamcenter
Siemens:Teamcenter Product Cost Management
Siemens:Teamcenter Share
Siemens:Teamcenter Visualization
Siemens:Tecnomatix Plant Simulation
Siemens:TestWay
Siemens:Valor NPI
Siemens:Verischarge
Siemens:VersiCloudHeliox Dual Port 60kW
Siemens:Voice alarm panels
Siemens:Voice alarm systems and audio matrices
Siemens:Workplace Experience
Siemens:WTV676-HB6035 Firmware
Siemens:WTV776-HB6035 Firmware
Siemens:Xcargo
Siemens:Xpedition Designer
Siemens:Xpedition Enterprise
Siemens:Xpedition Enterprise XCR
Siemens:Xpedition IC Packaging
Siemens:Xpedition Layout Browser
php:php
siemens:ruggedcom_ape1808_firmware
paloaltonetworks:pan-os
paloaltonetworks:panorama_virtual_appliance
siemens:amis_ts
siemens:blueplanet_360_nx3_m6_wm_od_iisx-s_firmware
siemens:energy_engage
siemens:spectrum_power_3
siemens:spectrum_power_4
siemens:spectrum_power_7
siemens:spectrum_power_tg
siemens:blueplanet_360_nx3_m6_wm_od_iisx_firmware
CVE-2026-99288 EUVD-2026-121963
UNKNOWN

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: inet: reject unhashed sockets during established lookups TCP established ehash lookups are lockless. The socket caches involved use SLAB_TYPESAFE_BY_RCU, so memory can be reused before an RCU reader that retained its old address has finished. After a tuple match, __inet_lookup_established() and __inet6_lookup_established() acquire a reference and repeat the tuple check. They do not check whether the new object is hashed. If the address is reused for a socket with the same tuple, the lookup can acquire a reference to the new object and return it while its nulls node is unhashed. A PoC that drives reuse with a SYN cookie request socket reproduced the crash. The new request socket is unhashed and has a NULL rsk_listener. A lookup that had loaded the address of the old request socket acquired the reference published by tcp_get_cookie_sock() and returned the new object. tcp_v4_rcv() then read sk_state through the NULL listener. The resulting crash was: BUG: kernel NULL pointer dereference, address: 0000000000000012 #PF: supervisor read access in kernel mode #PF: error_code(0x0000) - not-present page ... Oops: Oops: 0000 [#1] SMP NOPTI CPU: 4 UID: 0 PID: 0 Comm: swapper/4 Not tainted 7.3.0-00591-g0e135910deec #1 PREEMPT(lazy) ... RIP: 0010:tcp_v4_rcv+0x44e/0x1280 ... R10: 0000000000000001 R11: 00000000024ca8c0 R12: 0000000000000000 ... CR2: 0000000000000012 CR3: 0000000103d50004 CR4: 0000000000770ef0 ... Call Trace: <IRQ> ? raw_local_deliver+0xae/0x240 ip_protocol_deliver_rcu+0x2d/0x180 ip_local_deliver_finish+0x84/0x100 ip_sublist_rcv_finish+0x5f/0x70 ip_sublist_rcv+0x12a/0x1d0 ip_list_rcv+0xfd/0x130 __netif_receive_skb_list_core+0x223/0x250 netif_receive_skb_list_internal+0x1d2/0x2c0 ? try_fill_recv+0x39/0x7b0 napi_complete_done+0x74/0x170 virtnet_poll+0x445/0x600 __napi_poll+0x27/0x1e0 net_rx_action+0x2fe/0x3b0 handle_softirqs+0xc2/0x2c0 __irq_exit_rcu+0x74/0xd0 common_interrupt+0x7f/0x90 </IRQ> ... Kernel panic - not syncing: Fatal exception in interrupt After taking a reference, check whether the nulls node is unhashed in both IPv4 and IPv6 established lookups. If it is unhashed or the tuple no longer matches, drop the reference and restart the lookup. Lookups racing with the TIME_WAIT hashdance, or with a request being replaced by its child, now restart and find the new socket instead of returning the old one. Request sockets that were never inserted into ehash can have a nonzero refcount, and a stale lookup can hold a transient reference. Therefore, when SYN cookie, Fast Open, and request migration paths fail after setting a nonzero refcount, release the references held by those paths with reqsk_put() instead of freeing the request directly.

CVE-2026-109618 EUVD-2026-107260
CRITICAL

PHP uses longjmp() for out-of-memory (OOM) errors to exit the current context and abort handling of the request. Some contexts may not properly account for this scenario and leave request memory in an uninitialized state before performing an allocation. The subsequent request cleanup procedure may read or branch on this memory. Multiple OOM strategies can consistently trigger this condition and lead to remote code execution (RCE).

Siemens:AMIS TS
Siemens:AX4
Siemens:blueplanet 360 NX3 M6 WM OD IISX
Siemens:blueplanet 360 NX3 M6 WM OD IISX - S
Siemens:Building X
Siemens:CADRA
Siemens:Call stations
Siemens:Capital
Siemens:Chargesight
Siemens:Climatix Cloud IC
Siemens:Climatix Devices
Siemens:Connect Insights
Siemens:Connect X200
Siemens:Connect X300
Siemens:Connect X500
Siemens:cRSP
Siemens:Depotfinity
Siemens:Designcenter
Siemens:Designcenter X
Siemens:Designcenter X Essentials
Siemens:Desigo CC
Siemens:Desigo DXR2
Siemens:Desigo DXR3
Siemens:Desigo Optic
Siemens:Desigo PXC3
Siemens:Desigo PXC4
Siemens:Desigo PXC5
Siemens:Desigo PXC7
Siemens:DFMExpress
Siemens:Energy Engage V2.0SP9
Siemens:Energy Engage V3.1SP1
Siemens:Energy Management System
Siemens:Enlighted RTLS
Siemens:Enlighted Space
Siemens:Heliox Flex Pro
Siemens:Heliox H60
Siemens:Heliox Rapid
Siemens:HyperLynx
Siemens:Insights Hub
Siemens:Local Monitoring bt-monitoring-vm
Siemens:Navigator E\&S
Siemens:Novigo VANSYS
Siemens:Novigo VANSYS core
Siemens:Opcenter Connect Electronics
Siemens:Opcenter Connect MOM
Siemens:Opcenter Execution Core
Siemens:Opcenter Execution Discrete
Siemens:Opcenter Execution Foundation
Siemens:Opcenter Execution Pharma
Siemens:Opcenter Execution Process
Siemens:Opcenter Intelligence
Siemens:Opcenter Intra Plant Logistics
Siemens:Opcenter Quality
Siemens:Opcenter RDnL
Siemens:Opcenter X
Siemens:PACE-Design
Siemens:PADS Pro Essentials
Siemens:PADS Pro Student Edition
Siemens:PADS Professional
Siemens:PADS Professional - XCR
Siemens:PADS Standard - XCR
Siemens:PADS Standard \& Standard Plus
Siemens:Pathway to Learning Engineering
Siemens:Polarion
Siemens:QuadView
Siemens:RUGGEDCOM APE1808
Siemens:Sicharge D
Siemens:Sicharge D Configuration Backend
Siemens:SICHARGE FLEX
Siemens:SICHARGE UC
Siemens:Sifinity Control
Siemens:Sifinity Go
Siemens:Sifinity Setup
Siemens:Simcenter Flomaster
Siemens:Simcenter Flux
Siemens:Simcenter Simlab
Siemens:Sinteso FS20 EN
Siemens:SiPass integrated
Siemens:SIPORT
Siemens:Siveillance Control
Siemens:Siveillance Control Pro
Siemens:Siveillance Intrusion
Siemens:Siveillance Video
Siemens:Solid Edge
Siemens:Spectrum Power 4
Siemens:Spectrum Power 7
Siemens:Spectrum Power TG
Siemens:Supply Chain Suite
Siemens:Teamcenter
Siemens:Teamcenter Product Cost Management
Siemens:Teamcenter Share
Siemens:Teamcenter Visualization
Siemens:Tecnomatix Plant Simulation
Siemens:TestWay
Siemens:Valor NPI
Siemens:Verischarge
Siemens:VersiCloudHeliox Dual Port 60kW
Siemens:Voice alarm panels
Siemens:Voice alarm systems and audio matrices
Siemens:Workplace Experience
Siemens:WTV676-HB6035 Firmware
Siemens:WTV776-HB6035 Firmware
Siemens:Xcargo
Siemens:Xpedition Designer
Siemens:Xpedition Enterprise
Siemens:Xpedition Enterprise XCR
Siemens:Xpedition IC Packaging
Siemens:Xpedition Layout Browser
php:php
siemens:ruggedcom_ape1808_firmware
paloaltonetworks:pan-os
paloaltonetworks:panorama_virtual_appliance
siemens:blueplanet_360_nx3_m6_wm_od_iisx_firmware
siemens:blueplanet_360_nx3_m6_wm_od_iisx-s_firmware
siemens:energy_engage
siemens:local_monitoring_bt-monitoring-vm
siemens:spectrum_power_4
siemens:spectrum_power_7
siemens:spectrum_power_tg
siemens:amis_ts
CVE-2026-125350 EUVD-2026-121390
HIGH

Use after free in XML in Google Chrome prior to 157.0.8103.50 allowed a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code inside the sandbox via a crafted HTML page. (Chromium security severity: High)

google:chrome
Newly recorded security issues per week
Stay up to date! New information is added to our knowledge database every day. Here you can see the history of newly added vulnerabilities that have been added to our CVE DB in recent years.
Vulnerabilities by severity (over the last 7 days)
Information about the vulnerabilities of the last 7 days can be found here. As you can see, critical vulnerabilities are also added on a daily basis. Therefore, validate your current security situation sets on a daily basis to ensure the security of your IT.
CVSS Score Distribution
The CVSS score rates security vulnerabilities from 0 to 10, based on factors like attack vectors and impacts on confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
EPSS Score Distribution
The EPSS score predicts the likelihood of a known vulnerability being exploited, complementing CVSS by assessing real-world exploitability based on threat activity and exploit availability.
Enginsight Threat Intelligence
Our multi-source enrichment pipeline aggregates vulnerability data from dozens of security organizations worldwide — delivering affected product details and severity scores before the NVD has completed their analysis.
11,473
Early Detections
Vulnerabilities identified
before NVD analysis
5,182
Critical + High
CVSS 7.0 or above
among early detections
20+
Intelligence Sources
Security organizations
contributing data
---
Detections / Week
New vulnerabilities enriched
ahead of NVD each week
Monthly Early Detections
Vulnerabilities enriched with affected product data before NVD has completed analysis.
Severity Distribution
Severity breakdown of vulnerabilities detected ahead of the NVD.
Top Intelligence Sources
Security organizations contributing the most vulnerability intelligence to our database.
NVD Analysis Gap
Where our early detections stand in the NVD pipeline — most are still waiting for official analysis.
Latest Vulnerability Reports
The 10 most recently published CVE reports.
  • In Open Object Rexx (ooRexx) before 5.2.0, RXAPI relies on a world-writable /tmp file unless XDG_RUNTIME_DIR is set, or localhost TCP port 10010, allowing RXAPI communication by any local user, e.g., for injection of a macro that will be executed by a REXX script.

  • In Open Object Rexx (ooRexx) before 5.2.0, RXAPI mishandles nameArg and userid bounds checking, possibly leading to arbitrary code execution via crafted messages.

  • CVE-2026-93673 EUVD-2026-126671
    MEDIUM

    The Zephyr WebSocket client validates the server's handshake response in on_header_value() in subsys/net/lib/websocket/websocket.c. The comparison was performed as strncmp(at, str, length), where length is the length of the value the server sent rather than the length of the expected value, so the check only asked whether the received value was a prefix of the expected base64(SHA-1(key || GUID)). A server that returned a handful of correct characters passed, and a response carrying an empty Sec-WebSocket-Accept: header caused strncmp() to be called with a count of zero, which returns 0 and set ctx->sec_accept_ok with no comparison performed at all. The header-value callback also cleared ctx->sec_accept_present after the first chunk, so a value split across receive-buffer boundaries was only ever examined in part. ctx->sec_accept_ok is the sole WebSocket-specific gate in websocket_connect(); the client does not check the HTTP status code or the Upgrade:/Connection: headers. Any HTTP response containing an empty or prefix-matching Sec-WebSocket-Accept header therefore completed the handshake, after which the socket is finalized as a WebSocket and all further peer bytes are parsed as frames. The affected path is driven directly by remote input through subsys/net/lib/http/http_parser.c, and is reached by every user of websocket_connect(), including MQTT over WebSocket (subsys/net/lib/mqtt/mqtt_transport_websocket.c) and subsys/net/lib/ocpp/ocpp.c. The Sec-WebSocket-Accept exchange is not a secret-based authentication -- an endpoint or on-path attacker that sees the request can compute the expected value -- so the impact is bounded to parties that never observed the handshake request: a caching or transparent intermediary replaying a canned response, an off-path attacker injecting a spoofed response, or a non-WebSocket endpoint the client was induced to talk to. For those, the per-connection binding that RFC 6455 requires the client to enforce provided no protection at all, letting a single crafted response convince the device it holds a live WebSocket session and causing it to send application data to, and accept frames from, an unverified peer. There is no memory-safety consequence. The fix compares each delivered chunk against the expected value at the position reached so far, refuses a chunk that would overrun it, and accepts only once every byte of the expected value -- and no more -- has been matched; on_header_field() now also clears the flag for any other header so a partial value cannot be continued across an intervening header.

    zephyrproject:zephyr
  • CVE-2026-93672 EUVD-2026-126670
    MEDIUM

    bt_att_find_req_by_user_data() in subsys/bluetooth/host/att.c walks every ATT channel attached to a connection and dereferences chan->req->user_data without checking chan->req. An ATT channel with no client request in flight holds chan->req == NULL — that is its normal idle state, set by att_handle_rsp() when a response resolves the transaction and tested by att_req_send_process() to pick a free channel — so the lookup reads through a NULL pointer as soon as it visits an idle channel. Every other chan->req user in the file already guards the pointer. The lookup is reached from the public bt_gatt_cancel() API and, more importantly, from the host itself: bt_gatt_unsubscribe() calls bt_gatt_cancel() while a subscribe CCC write is still outstanding (BT_GATT_SUBSCRIBE_FLAG_WRITE_PENDING), and call_notify_cb_and_maybe_unsubscribe() in subsys/bluetooth/host/gatt.c invokes bt_gatt_unsubscribe() from the RX path whenever an application notify callback returns BT_GATT_ITER_STOP. A malicious or malfunctioning peer can hold the trigger window open by withholding the ATT Write Response to the CCC write and then sending a notification for the subscribed handle. With CONFIG_BT_EATT the traversal is very likely to meet an idle sibling channel, since ATT channels are prepended to the list and a channel opened after the pending request was sent is visited first. The dereference is a read of a small constant offset from address zero, so the impact is availability only: no memory corruption, no attacker-chosen address and no information disclosure. On platforms and configurations where a near-NULL read traps — TrustZone non-secure images, MMU targets, native_sim, or builds with CONFIG_NULL_POINTER_EXCEPTION_DETECTION_MPU/_DWT — the fault occurs in the Bluetooth RX context and results in a fatal error and device reset. On a plain Cortex-M build with the vector table mapped at address 0 and null-pointer detection disabled (the default) the read succeeds and the defect is inert. The fix adds an explicit chan->req != NULL test to the channel traversal and additionally rejects a NULL user_data argument, which would otherwise have matched, and cancelled, an unrelated request.

    zephyrproject:zephyr
  • CVE-2026-93671 EUVD-2026-126669
    LOW

    The websocket client's HTTP header callback on_header_value() in subsys/net/lib/websocket/websocket.c receives the Sec-WebSocket-Accept header value as a pointer/length pair from the HTTP parser. The referenced bytes live inside the application-supplied receive buffer and are not NUL terminated. When the received value did not match the expected accept key, the pointer was passed directly to a %s conversion in a NET_DBG() call, so the logging code measured the string with strlen() and read on past the end of the header value looking for a terminator. The value is supplied by the peer during the WebSocket handshake, before any application-level authentication, so a malicious or man-in-the-middle server reached over a ws:// (or otherwise attacker-terminated) connection can trigger the mismatch branch at will simply by answering with a wrong accept key. By sizing the response so the header value ends at the tail of the buffer passed to websocket_connect() as wreq->tmp_buf, the peer can make the scan run off the end of that buffer and into adjacent memory. The defective log statement is compiled in only when websocket debug logging is enabled (CONFIG_NET_WEBSOCKET_LOG_LEVEL_DBG=y, or CONFIG_LOG_DEFAULT_LEVEL=4); it is absent from a default build, which bounds exposure to diagnostic configurations. The consequence is an out-of-bounds read whose contents are emitted to the log stream: memory adjacent to the receive buffer is disclosed wherever the device's logs are collected or displayed. On targets where the memory following the buffer is not mapped, the scan can instead fault and terminate the connection or thread. No out-of-bounds write occurs, so there is no integrity impact. The fix copies at most sizeof(got) - 1 bytes of the parser-provided slice into a bounded stack buffer, NUL terminates the copy, and logs that instead, so the formatter never reads beyond the bytes the parser actually offered.

    zephyrproject:zephyr
  • CVE-2026-93670 EUVD-2026-126668
    LOW

    The Synopsys DesignWare I3C controller driver (drivers/i3c/i3c_dw.c) tracks free Device Address Table (DAT) slots with get_free_pos(), which signals an exhausted table by returning -1. The helper declared its return type as uint8_t, so the sentinel was truncated to 255, and both consumers (dw_i3c_attach_device() and dw_i3c_i2c_attach_device()) also stored it in a uint8_t before testing if (pos < 0) — a comparison that is never true for an unsigned value. The exhaustion guard was therefore inert in every build. With the guard defeated, an attach attempted on a full DAT proceeds with pos == 255: it writes data->dw_i3c_i2c_priv_data[255].id, more than 200 bytes past the end of the 32-element dw_i3c_i2c_priv_data array and past the end of struct dw_i3c_data; it stores the resulting out-of-bounds address in desc->controller_priv, from which later detach, reattach and IBI operations read the slot index back; and it performs a 32-bit MMIO store 1020 bytes beyond the hardware DAT base, outside the table the controller reports. The attach still returns success, so the upper layer believes the device is bound. The DAT is smaller than the software array (its depth is read from DEVICE_ADDR_TABLE_POINTER, commonly 8 or 16 entries), so exhaustion is reachable. In a dual-role build (CONFIG_I3C_DUAL_ROLE with CONFIG_I3C_USE_IBI) acting as a secondary controller, the attach count is supplied by the bus's active controller: i3c_sec_handoffed() attaches one device per entry of the received DEFTGTS list, so a hostile or malfunctioning controller on the local I3C bus that declares more targets than the local DAT depth triggers the condition once per surplus entry. Exhaustion can also be reached from a devicetree that declares more devices than the table holds, or by repeated i3c attach shell commands. Impact is bounded: the out-of-bounds store is a single byte of fixed value at a fixed displacement, with no attacker-chosen data or offset, so the realistic outcomes are corruption of neighbouring static driver state, writes into reserved controller registers, and inconsistent driver bookkeeping (a crash or a wedged I3C bus) rather than a controllable memory-write primitive. The attack vector is the local chip-to-chip I3C bus; there is no network-reachable path.

    zephyrproject:zephyr
  • CVE-2026-93669 EUVD-2026-126667
    MEDIUM

    The ITE IT8xxx2 SHI host-command backend in subsys/mgmt/ec_host_cmd/backends/ec_host_cmd_backend_shi_ite.c arms the SPI peripheral before its receive context exists. shi_ite_init_registers() sets the state machine to SHI_STATE_READY_TO_RECV and calls irq_enable() while the device initializes at POST_KERNEL priority CONFIG_KERNEL_INIT_PRIORITY_DEFAULT (40), but data->rx_ctx and data->tx are only assigned later by shi_ite_backend_init(), which ec_host_cmd_init() invokes at CONFIG_EC_HOST_CMD_INIT_PRIORITY (default 80). If the attached host processor starts a SPI transaction inside that window, the Rx-valid-length interrupt fires, shi_ite_int_handler() passes its state check and calls shi_ite_parse_header(), which stores the host-derived request length through the still-NULL data->rx_ctx. On the IT8xxx2 low addresses are not backed by RAM, and with CONFIG_NULL_POINTER_EXCEPTION_DETECTION_PMP the first bytes of the address space are explicitly made inaccessible, so the store raises a fatal access fault in interrupt context. The window widens further when CONFIG_EC_HOST_CMD_INITIALIZE_AT_BOOT is disabled and the application calls ec_host_cmd_init() itself. The result is a kernel panic on the embedded controller: with Zephyr's default fatal handler the CPU halts, so the controller stops servicing host commands until a hardware reset. Because the trigger is traffic from the attached host processor -- an untrusted peer from the controller firmware's point of view -- software on that host can provoke the fault by forcing a controller reset and issuing transactions during the reboot, turning a recoverable reset into a persistent outage. Impact is limited to availability: the faulting address is fixed and not attacker-chosen, so no memory-corruption primitive follows. The fix leaves the interface at SHI_STATE_DISABLED with the interrupt masked during device init, moves irq_enable() into shi_ite_backend_init() after the buffers are published, and makes shi_ite_int_handler() reject a NULL data->rx_ctx while write-clearing IT83XX_SPI_ISR and IT83XX_SPI_RX_VLISR so that an unexpected early interrupt cannot storm.

    zephyrproject:zephyr
  • CVE-2026-93668 EUVD-2026-126666
    MEDIUM

    The Bluetooth Classic SDP server in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/sdp.c allocated every response PDU through bt_sdp_create_pdu(), which expands to bt_l2cap_create_pdu() and therefore uses a K_FOREVER timeout. The allocation is made from sdp_pool, a fixed pool holding only CONFIG_BT_MAX_CONN buffers (one in the default configuration) that is shared with the SDP client role. When the pool is empty the call blocks without a bound. The allocation is reached from bt_sdp_recv() on the Bluetooth host's RX context: the bt_workq "BT RX WQ" workqueue in the default configuration since v3.1.0, and the dedicated "BT RX" thread before that. This context processes all normal-priority HCI events and all received ACL data. The SDP L2CAP server is registered on PSM 0x0001 with no security requirement (BT_SECURITY_L0), so an unpaired, unauthenticated BR/EDR peer within radio range of a connectable device can drive it. Every malformed or unrecognised SDP PDU reaches send_err_rsp(), and the sdp_svc_search_req(), sdp_svc_att_req() and sdp_svc_search_att_req() handlers allocate as well, so a short burst of pipelined requests drains the pool and parks the RX context in the blocking allocation. A pool buffer is released only once its response has been sent, and a peer that withholds baseband acknowledgements keeps the controller's buffers for the link full, so the response is never sent. While the RX context is blocked, the entire Bluetooth host, for all connections and both LE and BR/EDR, stops processing normal-priority HCI events and received data. In most affected releases the stall is permanent. Queued PDUs are freed only by connection or channel teardown, which waits for the normal-priority Disconnection Complete handler, and that handler runs on the blocked RX context, so the host does not recover without a reset. In v3.7.0 through v4.1.x the TX processor discards the queued response once the link supervision timeout drops the connection, so each stall ends at that timeout, but the peer can reconnect and repeat it for as long as it stays in range. The impact is limited to availability; no memory corruption or information disclosure is involved. The fix adds sdp_svc_create_pdu() using K_NO_WAIT, pre-allocates the response buffer once in bt_sdp_recv(), stashes the request in sdp->recv_pending when no buffer is available, and retries it from a work handler once a buffer is freed by the pool destroy callback.

    zephyrproject:zephyr
  • CVE-2026-93667 EUVD-2026-126665
    MEDIUM

    The Virtual L2 receive handler virtual_recv() in subsys/net/l2/virtual/virtual.c ends with a fall-through path meant for a virtual interface that has nothing attached below it: it takes net_if_get_device(iface)->api, treats it as a struct virtual_interface_api, and calls api->recv(iface, pkt). That handler is however also invoked with a non-virtual interface: ethernet_recv() in subsys/net/l2/ethernet/ethernet.c deliberately passes the Ethernet interface so that a tagged frame can be dispatched over the VLAN interfaces attached to it. For an Ethernet interface dev->api is a struct ethernet_api, whose layout only shares the leading struct net_if_api, so the slot read as recv is actually get_config() (default) or get_capabilities() (when CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_ETHERNET is enabled). The fall-through is reached whenever no attached virtual interface claims the frame - most simply when the VLAN interface owning the frame's tag exists but is administratively down, since net_eth_get_vlan_iface() resolves the tag without checking link state while virtual_recv() skips interfaces that are not up. Any host able to place an 802.1Q-tagged Ethernet frame on the same link can then trigger the mistyped indirect call; no authentication, IP reachability or user interaction is required, because the frame is consumed at L2 before any address check. The resulting call passes a struct net_if where the driver expects a struct device and a struct net_pkt where it expects a struct net_if , with the callee's remaining parameters left as whatever the call site happens to leave in the argument registers. Driver implementations dereference these values: get_capabilities() typically reads dev->config/dev->data (a wild read through a non-pointer field of struct net_if), and get_config() implementations write through the uninitialized struct ethernet_config * argument. The practical impact is undefined behaviour in the network RX path - crashes and uncontrolled memory corruption - plus mis-handling of the packet when a capability bitmask is returned as a net_verdict. The attacker controls neither the corrupted address nor the value written, so this is a denial-of-service and memory-corruption issue rather than a controllable write primitive. The same defective fall-through is reachable through any_recv() in subsys/net/l2/dummy/any/any.c, which passes a dummy interface whose struct dummy_api is shorter than the offset read, producing an out-of-bounds read of the driver's API object followed by an indirect call. The fix drops any packet whose interface is not a Virtual L2 interface, closing both entry points.

    zephyrproject:zephyr
  • CVE-2026-93666 EUVD-2026-126664
    MEDIUM

    The Bluetooth Classic SDP client built its outgoing request PDUs with bt_sdp_create_pdu(), which allocates from the sdp_pool net-buf pool with a K_FOREVER timeout and no failure handling, in sdp_client_ss_search(), sdp_client_sa_search() and sdp_client_ssa_search() in subsys/bluetooth/host/classic/sdp.c. All of these run on the Bluetooth workqueue bt_workq (via sdp_client_work_handler(), the L2CAP sdp_client_connected() callback, or the continuation-state follow-up from a received response), which is the same single thread that dispatches incoming HCI ACL and event traffic, drives L2CAP, and performs connection and channel teardown. sdp_pool holds only CONFIG_BT_MAX_CONN buffers (one by default) and is shared with the SDP server role. An unauthenticated peer within BR/EDR range can drive both halves of the trigger. The SDP L2CAP server is registered at BT_SECURITY_L0, so any inbound SDP request makes the device allocate the pool's buffer for a response, which is held until the controller has transmitted it. The same peer can then cause a client request to be issued while the pool is empty: in-tree profiles start SDP discovery from inbound connection callbacks (for example hfp_hf_accept() calls bt_sdp_discover() through hfp_hf_create(), and hfp_ag.c mirrors this), and a peer acting as an SDP server can force repeated client requests by answering with partial responses carrying continuation state. With the pool empty, the allocation blocks uninterruptibly and freezes the entire Bluetooth host. The stall becomes permanent when the release of the outstanding buffer itself depends on the blocked workqueue: if the link carrying the queued PDU is dropped or stalls, hci_disconn_complete() and the L2CAP channel cleanup that purges the channel TX queue are themselves bt_workq work items, so the buffer is never returned. The result is an unrecoverable denial of service of all Bluetooth functionality until reboot; there is no memory-safety, confidentiality or integrity impact. The fix allocates client PDUs with K_NO_WAIT via a new sdp_client_create_pdu(), propagates -ENOBUFS, parks the session on a new SDP_CLIENT_FLAG_WAIT_FOR_TX_BUF flag, and adds an sdp_pool destructor that re-submits the SDP client worker when a buffer becomes available. Note that the SDP server role still allocated from the same pool with K_FOREVER at this commit; that path was addressed separately.

    zephyrproject:zephyr