On a multi-user system, a user with an active local login session could downgrade a system-wide Flatpak app to an older version by removing the app's remote ref via the unprivileged system-helper RemoveLocalRef method, causing the anti-downgrade check to fail to find a reference date. A malicious local user could use this to expose other users of the same system to an app version with unfixed vulnerabilities.

The OCI delta stream parser read sizes as guint64 but passed them to GLib I/O and allocation functions expecting gsize (32 bits on 32-bit systems), causing undersized allocations while subsequent operations use the original 64-bit size, leading to heap buffer overflows. An attacker controlling an OCI registry can craft a delta stream that triggers this during flatpak install/update, potentially achieving code execution on 32-bit systems.

Nezha 2.2.3 contains a Host header injection regression in the OAuth2 redirect endpoint. When the new optional dashboard_host setting is empty, /api/v1/oauth2/{provider} (cmd/dashboard/controller/oauth2.go) reflects the attacker-supplied HTTP Host header into the redirect_uri sent to the identity provider instead of falling back to the configured install_host. An attacker who induces a victim to begin OAuth2 login via a request that reaches Nezha with a forged Host header can cause an attacker-controlled callback URL to be used as the redirect_uri; if the OAuth2 provider accepts it, the victim's authorization code is delivered to the attacker origin, allowing the attacker to complete the OAuth2 login/binding flow and take over the account. This regresses the fix for GHSA-9rc6-8cjv-rcvx and is configuration-dependent (dashboard_host empty). At the time of the advisory no patched version was available.

Nezha before 2.2.7 contains an information disclosure vulnerability in the GET /api/v1/profile endpoint that returns the bcrypt-hashed password field of authenticated users. Attackers can extract password hashes and perform offline cracking attacks without rate limiting or audit trail constraints.

Nezha is a server and website monitoring tool. In versions >= 2.2.11 and < 2.3.1, the service sentinel worker (service/singleton/servicesentinel.go) contains an incomplete fix for a previously reported nil dereference denial of service (GHSA-qjpp-gffx-2wm9). The 2026-07-21 fix re-validated the service lifecycle under serviceResponseDataStoreLock but reused an already-captured, now stale reporter pointer and never re-validated the server, and that lock does not guard ServerShared. An authenticated user with the member role who owns an agent can issue a concurrent server delete (POST /api/v1/batch-delete/server) for their own server to win the race window, causing the worker to dereference a missing entry in the server list snapshot. Because the sentinel workers and the gRPC server have no recover()/recovery interceptor, the resulting panic is unrecovered and crashes the entire instance. This is fixed in version 2.3.1.

Nezha versions 2.0.10 through 2.3.2 use a restricted HTTP client to validate user-configurable notification and DDNS webhook URLs, but the denylist did not cover IPv6 transition ranges — specifically the 6to4 prefix 2002::/16 and the local-use IPv4/IPv6 translation prefix 64:ff9b:1::/48. Because such addresses satisfy Go's netip.Addr.IsGlobalUnicast check, the URL validator accepted them. An authenticated user able to configure a webhook may be able to cause the dashboard to issue requests to an otherwise restricted IPv6 endpoint, but only where the dashboard's network provides unusual or non-standards-compliant routing for these transition ranges; no direct path to an IPv4 metadata, loopback, or private-network HTTP request has been demonstrated. The issue is fixed in version 2.3.3 (commit d1fcde8e), which blocks both prefixes.

Nezha Dashboard versions before 2.3.5 fail to restrict service monitor task types to supported probe types, allowing authenticated users with nezha:service:write scope to submit privileged task types through the service API. Attackers can deliver command execution or Agent configuration tasks to Agents within their authorization scope by exploiting the shared protobuf Task.Type namespace between service monitors and privileged operations.

Nezha before 2.3.8 fails to validate alert rule type and duration bounds, allowing authenticated non-administrator users to create malformed rules that trigger unrecovered panics in the alert evaluator goroutine. Attackers can submit a crafted alert rule via the POST /api/v1/alert-rule endpoint to crash the dashboard process, which persists the rule and causes repeated crashes on restart, disabling all monitoring and control plane functionality.

obot versions before v0.21.1 fail to enforce Access Control Rules on the /mcp-connect endpoint, allowing any authenticated user to connect to restricted MCP servers if they possess the server ID. Attackers can bypass authorization checks to access and manipulate sensitive backend systems through MCP tool calls using stored OAuth credentials.

Obot is an open-source AI agent/MCP platform. In all versions up to and including commit d7e6970, the Docker quickstart command documented in the README starts the container listening on 0.0.0.0:8080 with authentication disabled by default. When authentication is disabled, every request is mapped to a synthetic "nobody" user that holds the Owner and Admin roles, so any unauthenticated party who can reach the exposed port obtains full administrative access to the Obot API and UI, including the ability to register and launch attacker-controlled MCP servers. Because the quickstart also mounts /var/run/docker.sock into the container, the MCP runtime backend reachable this way has access to the host's Docker control surface. The fix is documentation-only: the quickstart now enables authentication, and operators who followed the previous instructions should set OBOT_SERVER_ENABLE_AUTHENTICATION=true before exposing the host to any untrusted network.