CVE-2025-40007

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

netfs: fix reference leak

Commit 20d72b00ca81 ("netfs: Fix the request's work item to not
require a ref") modified netfs_alloc_request() to initialize the
reference counter to 2 instead of 1.  The rationale was that the
requet's "work" would release the second reference after completion
(via netfs_{read,write}_collection_worker()).  That works most of the
time if all goes well.

However, it leaks this additional reference if the request is released
before the I/O operation has been submitted: the error code path only
decrements the reference counter once and the work item will never be
queued because there will never be a completion.

This has caused outages of our whole server cluster today because
tasks were blocked in netfs_wait_for_outstanding_io(), leading to
deadlocks in Ceph (another bug that I will address soon in another
patch).  This was caused by a netfs_pgpriv2_begin_copy_to_cache() call
which failed in fscache_begin_write_operation().  The leaked
netfs_io_request was never completed, leaving `netfs_inode.io_count`
with a positive value forever.

All of this is super-fragile code.  Finding out which code paths will
lead to an eventual completion and which do not is hard to see:

- Some functions like netfs_create_write_req() allocate a request, but
  will never submit any I/O.

- netfs_unbuffered_read_iter_locked() calls netfs_unbuffered_read()
  and then netfs_put_request(); however, netfs_unbuffered_read() can
  also fail early before submitting the I/O request, therefore another
  netfs_put_request() call must be added there.

A rule of thumb is that functions that return a `netfs_io_request` do
not submit I/O, and all of their callers must be checked.

For my taste, the whole netfs code needs an overhaul to make reference
counting easier to understand and less fragile & obscure.  But to fix
this bug here and now and produce a patch that is adequate for a
stable backport, I tried a minimal approach that quickly frees the
request object upon early failure.

I decided against adding a second netfs_put_request() each time
because that would cause code duplication which obscures the code
further.  Instead, I added the function netfs_put_failed_request()
which frees such a failed request synchronously under the assumption
that the reference count is exactly 2 (as initially set by
netfs_alloc_request() and never touched), verified by a
WARN_ON_ONCE().  It then deinitializes the request object (without
going through the "cleanup_work" indirection) and frees the allocation
(with RCU protection to protect against concurrent access by
netfs_requests_seq_start()).

All code paths that fail early have been changed to call
netfs_put_failed_request() instead of netfs_put_request().
Additionally, I have added a netfs_put_request() call to
netfs_unbuffered_read() as explained above because the
netfs_put_failed_request() approach does not work there.
ProviderTypeBase ScoreAtk. VectorAtk. ComplexityPriv. RequiredVector
NISTNIST
UNKNOWN
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LinuxCNA
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Awaiting analysis
This vulnerability is currently awaiting analysis.
Base Score
CVSS 3.x
EPSS Score
Percentile: Unknown
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Debian Releases
Debian Product
Codename
linux
bullseye
5.10.223-1
not-affected
trixie
6.12.43-1
not-affected
bookworm
6.1.148-1
not-affected
bullseye (security)
5.10.244-1
fixed
bookworm (security)
6.1.153-1
fixed
trixie (security)
6.12.48-1
fixed
forky
vulnerable
sid
6.16.12-2
fixed