CVE-2026-31411

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

net: atm: fix crash due to unvalidated vcc pointer in sigd_send()

Reproducer available at [1].

The ATM send path (sendmsg -> vcc_sendmsg -> sigd_send) reads the vcc
pointer from msg->vcc and uses it directly without any validation. This
pointer comes from userspace via sendmsg() and can be arbitrarily forged:

    int fd = socket(AF_ATMSVC, SOCK_DGRAM, 0);
    ioctl(fd, ATMSIGD_CTRL);  // become ATM signaling daemon
    struct msghdr msg = { .msg_iov = &iov, ... };
    *(unsigned long *)(buf + 4) = 0xdeadbeef;  // fake vcc pointer
    sendmsg(fd, &msg, 0);  // kernel dereferences 0xdeadbeef

In normal operation, the kernel sends the vcc pointer to the signaling
daemon via sigd_enq() when processing operations like connect(), bind(),
or listen(). The daemon is expected to return the same pointer when
responding. However, a malicious daemon can send arbitrary pointer values.

Fix this by introducing find_get_vcc() which validates the pointer by
searching through vcc_hash (similar to how sigd_close() iterates over
all VCCs), and acquires a reference via sock_hold() if found.

Since struct atm_vcc embeds struct sock as its first member, they share
the same lifetime. Therefore using sock_hold/sock_put is sufficient to
keep the vcc alive while it is being used.

Note that there may be a race with sigd_close() which could mark the vcc
with various flags (e.g., ATM_VF_RELEASED) after find_get_vcc() returns.
However, sock_hold() guarantees the memory remains valid, so this race
only affects the logical state, not memory safety.

[1]: https://gist.github.com/mrpre/1ba5949c45529c511152e2f4c755b0f3