CVE-2026-46008

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

mm/damon/core: fix damos_walk() vs kdamond_fn() exit race

When kdamond_fn() main loop is finished, the function cancels remaining
damos_walk() request and unset the damon_ctx->kdamond so that API callers
and API functions themselves can show the context is terminated. 
damos_walk() adds the caller's request to the queue first.  After that, it
shows if the kdamond of the damon_ctx is still running (damon_ctx->kdamond
is set).  Only if the kdamond is running, damos_walk() starts waiting for
the kdamond's handling of the newly added request.

The damos_walk() requests registration and damon_ctx->kdamond unset are
protected by different mutexes, though.  Hence, damos_walk() could race
with damon_ctx->kdamond unset, and result in deadlocks.

For example, let's suppose kdamond successfully finished the damow_walk()
request cancelling.  Right after that, damos_walk() is called for the
context.  It registers the new request, and shows the context is still
running, because damon_ctx->kdamond unset is not yet done.  Hence the
damos_walk() caller starts waiting for the handling of the request. 
However, the kdamond is already on the termination steps, so it never
handles the new request.  As a result, the damos_walk() caller thread
infinitely waits.

Fix this by introducing another damon_ctx field, namely
walk_control_obsolete.  It is protected by the
damon_ctx->walk_control_lock, which protects damos_walk() request
registration.  Initialize (unset) it in kdamond_fn() before letting
damon_start() returns and set it just before the cancelling of the
remaining damos_walk() request is executed.  damos_walk() reads the
obsolete field under the lock and avoids adding a new request.

After this change, only requests that are guaranteed to be handled or
cancelled are registered.  Hence the after-registration DAMON context
termination check is no longer needed.  Remove it together.

The issue is found by sashiko [1].