CVE-2026-74472

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ublk: reset kernel-owned dev_info fields in ublk_ctrl_add_dev()

ublk_ctrl_add_dev() memcpy()s the userspace ublksrv_ctrl_dev_info into
ub->dev_info and then fixes up the fields the driver owns, but misses
->state and ->ublksrv_pid.

A device added with ->state = UBLK_S_DEV_LIVE passes the
"->state != UBLK_S_DEV_DEAD" test that ublk_stop_dev_unlocked() uses as its
proxy for "a disk is attached", while ->ub_disk is still NULL, so DEL_DEV
right after ADD_DEV oopses in del_gendisk().  UBLK_S_DEV_QUIESCED plus
UBLK_F_USER_RECOVERY dies one step earlier, in ublk_force_abort_dev().  A
poisoned ->state also gets START_USER_RECOVERY and the char device
read/write path onto a device that was never started, and wedges START_DEV
at -EEXIST.  A poisoned ->ublksrv_pid just makes GET_DEV_INFO report an
unrelated task as the ublk server.

Reset both after the memcpy(), as ublk_detach_disk() does.  Userspace only
ever reads these back, so correcting them silently breaks nothing.

ADD_DEV has copied ->state in unsanitized since ublk was merged, but back
then it was harmless: the gendisk was allocated during ADD_DEV, and both
teardown and the START_DEV -EEXIST check keyed off disk_live() rather than
->state.  The oops became reachable once the disk allocation moved to
START_DEV and those checks switched to ->state.