CVE-2026-89490

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

ocfs2: fix readdir position truncation on 32-bit kernels

In ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_el(), the directory cookie position is
rebuilt with

	ctx->pos = (ctx->pos & ~(sb->s_blocksize - 1)) | offset;

`ctx->pos` is loff_t (signed 64-bit), while `sb->s_blocksize` is
unsigned long.  On 32-bit kernels unsigned long is 32-bit, so the mask

	~(sb->s_blocksize - 1)

is computed as a 32-bit unsigned value (e.g. 0xfffff000 for a 4 KiB
block size).  In the AND expression with the 64-bit `ctx->pos`, that
unsigned operand is zero-extended to 64 bits per the usual arithmetic
conversions, yielding 0x00000000fffff000.  The high 32 bits of
`ctx->pos` are silently cleared, even though directory size is
allowed to exceed 4 GiB.

When readdir() crosses the 4 GiB boundary on a 32-bit kernel the
position is reset back into the first 4 GiB block, making the
re-validation path re-enumerate already-returned dirents indefinitely.

This is ocfs2_dir_foreach_blk_el(), the extent-list readdir path taken
for all non-inline directories, so a directory large enough to cross
4 GiB reaches it.

This is the same class of bug that commit 3dce5bb82c97 ("exfat: Fix
bitwise operation having different size") fixed in exfat, and the
fix mirrors the equivalent ext4 fix in this series.  Cast the operand
to loff_t so the mask is 64-bit before the AND:

	ctx->pos = (ctx->pos & ~((loff_t)sb->s_blocksize - 1)) | offset;

64-bit kernels are unaffected.