CVE-2026-89583

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

Bluetooth: eir: Fix OOB read in eir_get_service_data()

eir_get_service_data() walks the advertising data for a Service Data
field with a matching UUID.  On a mismatch it advances:

    eir += dlen;
    eir_len -= dlen;

eir_get_data() reports dlen as the field's data length, but the field
spans dlen + 2 bytes once its length and type bytes count, and more
when non-Service-Data fields were skipped to reach it.  The pointer
lands correctly on the next field.  eir_len does not, and the shortfall
compounds across fields until eir_get_data() reads the length and type
bytes of a "field" past the end of the buffer.

For an ISO broadcast sink that buffer is hcon->le_per_adv_data[], filled
from the periodic advertising reports of a remote broadcaster.  A PA
payload packed with mismatching Service Data fields walks off the array
into the rest of struct hci_conn.  A drifted field that matches the BAA
UUID puts those bytes in iso_pi(sk)->base, where user space reads them
back with getsockopt(BT_ISO_BASE).

Recompute eir_len from the end of the buffer each iteration.