CVE-2026-89675

EUVD-2026-76587
In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved:

nfsd: fix UAF in async copy cancel and shutdown

An async copy could be freed or used after free while a teardown caller
(OFFLOAD_CANCEL, nfsd4_shutdown_copy, nfsd4_cancel_copy_by_sb) raced the
copy kthread:

  - find_async_copy() bumped copy->refcount but left the copy on
    clp->async_copies, so the reaper's cleanup_async_copy() could run
    release_copy_files() concurrently with a cancel/shutdown caller. Both
    put and NULL nf_src/nf_dst without a common lock, double-putting the
    nfsd_file and freeing it early.

  - nfsd4_do_async_copy() set NFSD4_COPY_F_STOPPED before its final uses
    of the copy (nfsd_update_cmtime_attr() on copy->nf_dst,
    nfsd4_send_cb_offload()). nfsd4_stop_copy() treats a set STOPPED bit
    as "kthread done, skip kthread_stop()", so a teardown caller ran
    release_copy_files() -- which puts and NULLs nf_dst -- while the
    kthread still dereferenced it (NULL/UAF).

  - copy->copy_task was never pinned. The one-shot kthread self-reaps on
    return, so kthread_stop()'s get_task_struct() could touch a freed
    task_struct.

  - co_cb is embedded in the copy, but nfsd4_send_cb_offload() held a
    reference only on the client, so a concurrent teardown could free
    the copy while the CB_OFFLOAD callback was in flight.

Fix the teardown lifetime as a whole:

  - find_async_copy() unlinks the copy (clear cp_clp, list_del_init)
    under async_lock; the cancel, shutdown, and sb-cancel paths drop the
    list-membership reference via nfs4_put_copy() after nfsd4_stop_copy().
    Drop the now-redundant list_del fixup from cleanup_async_copy().

  - Because unlinking hides the copy from the reaper, its
    cleanup_async_copy() can no longer remove the copy's s2s_cp_stateids
    entry; the cancel/shutdown/sb-cancel paths now call
    nfs4_free_copy_state() themselves (while cp_clp is still valid) so
    the entry does not dangle at freed memory for the laundromat and
    manage_cpntf_state() to dereference.

  - Give the kthread its own reference, taken in nfsd4_copy() before
    wake_up_process() and dropped at the end of nfsd4_do_async_copy();
    call wake_up_process() before list_add().

  - Pin the task_struct with get_task_struct() in nfsd4_copy(), released
    in nfs4_put_copy(), so kthread_stop() is safe whenever the kthread
    exits. Set NFSD4_COPY_F_STOPPED only in nfsd4_stop_copy(), which now
    always kthread_stop()s before release_copy_files(); completion is
    still reported via NFSD4_COPY_F_COMPLETED, so
    nfsd4_has_active_async_copies() is unaffected. Each teardown caller
    removes the copy from clp->async_copies first, so kthread_stop() runs
    exactly once.

  - Take a copy reference in nfsd4_send_cb_offload(), dropped in
    nfsd4_cb_offload_release(). The kthread still holds its own reference
    there, so the refcount_inc() cannot race the final free.

  - Read cp_clp with smp_load_acquire() to pair with the unordered
    set_bit()/clear_bit() writers (Documentation/atomic_bitops.rst).
ProviderTypeBase ScoreAtk. VectorAtk. ComplexityPriv. RequiredVector
NISTPrimary
9.8 CRITICAL
NETWORK
LOW
NONE
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Awaiting analysis
This vulnerability is currently awaiting analysis.
Base Score
CVSS 3.x
EPSS Score
Percentile: 6.13%
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