CVE-2026-93667

EUVD-2026-126665
The Virtual L2 receive handler virtual_recv() in subsys/net/l2/virtual/virtual.c ends with a fall-through path meant for a virtual interface that has nothing attached below it: it takes net_if_get_device(iface)->api, treats it as a struct virtual_interface_api, and calls api->recv(iface, pkt). That handler is however also invoked with a non-virtual interface: ethernet_recv() in subsys/net/l2/ethernet/ethernet.c deliberately passes the Ethernet interface so that a tagged frame can be dispatched over the VLAN interfaces attached to it. For an Ethernet interface dev->api is a struct ethernet_api, whose layout only shares the leading struct net_if_api, so the slot read as recv is actually get_config() (default) or get_capabilities() (when CONFIG_NET_STATISTICS_ETHERNET is enabled).

The fall-through is reached whenever no attached virtual interface claims the frame - most simply when the VLAN interface owning the frame's tag exists but is administratively down, since net_eth_get_vlan_iface() resolves the tag without checking link state while virtual_recv() skips interfaces that are not up. Any host able to place an 802.1Q-tagged Ethernet frame on the same link can then trigger the mistyped indirect call; no authentication, IP reachability or user interaction is required, because the frame is consumed at L2 before any address check.

The resulting call passes a struct net_if  where the driver expects a struct device  and a struct net_pkt  where it expects a struct net_if , with the callee's remaining parameters left as whatever the call site happens to leave in the argument registers. Driver implementations dereference these values: get_capabilities() typically reads dev->config/dev->data (a wild read through a non-pointer field of struct net_if), and get_config() implementations write through the uninitialized struct ethernet_config * argument. The practical impact is undefined behaviour in the network RX path - crashes and uncontrolled memory corruption - plus mis-handling of the packet when a capability bitmask is returned as a net_verdict. The attacker controls neither the corrupted address nor the value written, so this is a denial-of-service and memory-corruption issue rather than a controllable write primitive.

The same defective fall-through is reachable through any_recv() in subsys/net/l2/dummy/any/any.c, which passes a dummy interface whose struct dummy_api is shorter than the offset read, producing an out-of-bounds read of the driver's API object followed by an indirect call. The fix drops any packet whose interface is not a Virtual L2 interface, closing both entry points.
ProviderTypeBase ScoreAtk. VectorAtk. ComplexityPriv. RequiredVector
zephyrCNA
5.9 MEDIUM
ADJACENT_NETWORK
HIGH
NONE
CVSS:3.1/AV:A/AC:H/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:L/A:H
Base Score
CVSS 3.x
EPSS Score
Percentile: Unknown
Early Detection
Affected products identified ahead of NVD analysis through intelligence sources (CNA/ADP records, vendor advisories, Enginsight analysis).
VendorProductVersionSource
zephyrprojectzephyr
4.2.0 ≤
𝑥
< 4.3.2
CNA
zephyrprojectzephyr
4.4.0 ≤
𝑥
< 4.5.0
CNA